This paper reflects on the nature of law reform as carried out by law commissions. This is in the context of the author's experience in the Northern Ireland Law Commission. The paper assesses the importance of independence in any law reform body and the particular impact which law commissioners may bring to the law reform process. The paper looks at the history of law reform in Northern Ireland leading to the establishment of the Commission with a brief overview of the work of the Commission. The conclusion is that there is a role for effective law reform driven by commissioner led independent law commissions. 1
The Northern Ireland Law Commission
I must of course, as a former Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Law Commission ('NILC' or 'the Commission'), start with a disclaimer: I do not purport to speak on behalf of the Commission and it is for others to judge the success or otherwise of the work of the Commission during my  Chair and commissioners appointed by government for fixed terms of years: commonly 3 or 5 years with sometimes provision for re-appointment;  The commissions are to be independent of government;  There must be proper arrangements for financial accountability;  Their work is generally carried out under 'Programmes of Law Reform' setting out for a term of years (such as three or five years) a programme of topics of law reform to be tackled in the period;  Generally, these programmes require the consent of government -through the sponsoring department such as the Department for Justice;  Public consultation usually takes place before a programme of work is published;  In carrying out the work the commissions will engage in their own research and in extensive consultation on each topic in the programme;  This usually involves a consultation paper and possibly other discussion papers and other modes of engaging with those having any interest in the topic;  Ultimately, the commission will produce a report containing its review of the topic and its recommendations for reform and often a draft bill setting out how the reforms might be effected in legislation;  It is then for government to decide whether or not to implement the recommendations: each commission strives for a successful 'implementation rate';  As well as carrying out the programme topics commissions may also accept references from government departments of other topics where law reform is thought appropriate;  Some commissions also engage in programmes of consolidation of legislation and repeal of redundant legislation;
In the larger commissions such as the Law Commission for England and Wales there are full time commissioners who take 'career breaks' from their academic or professional careers for the duration of their appointments as Commissioners. In the smaller commissions such as NILC this may not be possible; the Chairman and Commissioners in NILC have all been part time appointments.
Whether or not the Commissioners are full time, another important element in all commissions is the research team: generally there is a full time, permanent cadre of researchers and sometimes for particular projects individuals with special expertise may be engaged for the duration of the project.
Generally, a Commissioner will lead a project with a team of researchers working with him or her and good working relations are of course essential to the success of each project.
NILC's work
To date the work of the Commission has included: The question may be raised, whatever the merits of these projects, does the law reform have to be carried out by a law commission: for instance previously in Northern Ireland (see further section 5 below) the law reform function was performed without benefit of a law commission as such? I consider this further in my concluding sections, but first set out the current, rather parlous position of NILC and then some of the historical background.
The current position of NILC
In 2012 the Commission underwent a Quinquennial Review which was carried out on behalf of the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland. The Review was, of course, independent of the Commission. The Review was known as the 'Hunter Review' after the senior retired Northern Ireland civil servant who carried it out. Mr Hunter completed his Report and sent to the Department at the end of January 2013, but it has not yet been published. The Department has not yet issued any statement as to its plans for the future of the Commission. In a written answer on 18 April 2014, to a question raised by a member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Minister of Justice announced that a business case had been prepared following consideration of a number of options for the Commission's future and that he hoped to be able shortly to agree a way forward and to make the necessary announcement. However, no such announcement has yet been made.
Unfortunately also, the post of Chairman and three of the Commissioner posts have not been filled in the same period of time 11 . In a further Assembly reply on 18 April 2014 the Minister stated that he had determined that the posts should not be filled until the decisions had been taken as to the Commission's future. So currently the Commission faces an uncertain future with only one Commissioner in post.
Thus, although some important law reform work is currently on going, the Commission is an unfortunate state of limbo at the moment. Indeed, the question arises should the DoJ perform its statutory functions of making appointments of Chair and Commissioners under the 2002 Act, rather than constant deferment of such appointments? However, the DoJ, along with other Departments of the Northern Ireland Executive, is under severe budgetary constraints currently, and the Minister has warned that serious cuts in services will have to be made. It is quite likely, therefore, that no announcement in regard to the Commission will 6 NILC 10 (2011) 7 NILC 14 (2012) 8 NILC 16 (2013) 9 NILC 17 (2013) 10 NILC 18 (2014) 11 Furthermore, there is currently no Chief Executive in post. An ' Interim Chief Executive' was appointed in May 2014 on a part time basis -see www.nilawcommission.gov.uk (accessed 19 September 2014) be made until the Department is in a position to announce its budget decisions, and the future of the Commission may well be influenced by the need for stringent economies.
Nevertheless I still believe there is value in the law commission model of law reform and in the remainder of this article I go on to stet out my reasons. I start however, with some explanation of the history of law reform in Northern Ireland. So it may be thought that the institution of NILC in 2007 14 was a 're-forming' 15 of the law reform institutions of Northern Ireland: that NILC subsumed the role and duties of both the Office of Law Reform and the Advisory Committee, and that the main institutional change was that it was under the wing of and reported to firstly the Northern Ireland Office and then, on the devolution of policing and justice, to the DoJ in place of these roles being carried out by Department of Finance and Personnel.
The history of law reform in Northern Ireland
My thesis is that such view fundamentally mis-understands the particular role that should be performed by a law commission as such, as compared with other institutional arrangements for law reform such as prevailed in Northern Ireland from 1965 to 2007.
Why have an independent Law Commission?
The other jurisdiction on the island of Ireland has enjoyed an independent law commission for now almost 40 years, as the Irish Law Reform Commission ('ILRC') was formed in 1975. In 2005 on its 30 th Anniversary the former Chief Justice the Honourable Mr Justice Ronan Keane delivered a paper considering and celebrating the work of ILRC over that 30 year period. 12 This was in response, I understand, to the creation in 1965 for Great Britain of the Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission. Ireland followed some ten years later with the creation of the Law Reform Commission of Ireland -based largely on the GB law commission model. However, he commenced by considering the nature and function of successful law reform bodies: "First they must be independent of government. A body which is simply another branch of the executive will inevitably be perceived as being concerned with implementing whatever may be government policy at any particular time rather than bring forward proposals for law reform which, viewed objectively, can be seen as in the interests of society as a whole." 16 It seems to me that this is the mark which should distinguish NILC from the Office of Law Reform and the Advisory Committee. The point may well be made that both those bodies did distinguished work of benefit to Northern Ireland and that no-one can point to any partisan or other activity subservient to government on the part of either body. I agree. But it must be noted that both the Office and Advisory Committee carried out most of their work during the long regime of direct rule in Northern Ireland: a time during which the attention of local politicians was properly directed to other fundamental matters.
So in my view the Office of Law Reform/Advisory Committee model will no longer run effectively with directly elected Members in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive, all with party manifestos and political policy commitments to implement. I return to this point later.
It may also be observed that Office/Advisory Committee dealt largely with matters of law reform that might be termed 'lawyers law' and I turn to this in the next section.
What is the nature of independent law reform?
NILC as other law commissions is largely composed of lawyers 17 and the question arises as to whether at all a law reform body should concern itself with matters of policy or should restrain itself to matters that might be described as 'lawyer's law'?
Certainly the Advisory Committee in its First Programme of Law Reform stated that in considering its approach (among other considerations): ". . .the Committee will concern itself primarily with 'lawyers' law'. In accordance with that principle its recommendations for reform of the civil law in Northern Ireland will be of a nature that can appropriately be put forward by a body of lawyers on the basis of legal principle and pragmatic common sense after due public consultation. The Committee emphasises that the sphere in which it should operate will be one which is not intended to involve controversial policy decisions or value judgments." 18 This emphasis, it may be argued, was prudent on the part of a body with the most limited of resources whose members were all in full time engagement in the law, whether in the judiciary, in the profession or in the university.
However, in the early days of the Law Commission in England and Wales, Mr Justice Scarman (as he then was), the first Chairman of the Commission, set out a bolder vision. He referred to a recent address by Lord Devlin which:-". . . drew a distinction between what [Lord Devlin] labelled 'lawyers' law reform' and social or political law reform. When the law is changed in order to achieve a new social or political 16 The Keane Paper, p.6 17 Though NILC has one 'lay' commissioner as well 18 objective, this [Lord Devlin] said was not lawyers' law reform; but when social and political objectives are agreed and it is found that the law is defective in carrying them out, this, [Lord Devlin] said, was properly described as law reform. If Lord Devlin was arguing for the existence of a special world of lawyers' law, I would respectfully disagree. There is no cosy little world of lawyers' law in which learned men may frolic without raising socially controversial issues." 19 I would also subscribe to the view expressed by Lord Scarman that: " . . . the challenge of law reform is that it can only be successfully achieved by the combination of the lawyer's learning and the social awareness of the community." 20 We shall have to wait for the publication of Mr Hunter's Report for an assessment of how successfully NILC has carried out this in all its work and in the various Reports so far published.
Failure of full acknowledgement of NILC's operational independence
However, I am concerned that the DoJ currently does not fully recognise the operational independence of the Commission.
At the heart of relationship between the Department and the Commission is the 'Relationship Document' (available on the Commission's website) 21 . This Document :-" . . . notes and records [NILC's] overall aims, objectives and targets in support of DOJ's wider strategic aims, 22 including in particular:
 the delivery of a fair and impartial system of justice to the community in Northern Ireland;
 the delivery of justice effectively and efficiently; and  the development of the law of Northern Ireland to ensure that it remains appropriate, fair and accessible to the community.
 the rules and guidelines relevant to the exercise of the Commission's functions, and duties;
 the conditions under which any public funds are paid to the Commission; and  how the Commission is to be held to account for its performance." 23
It is my personal view that this is a constraint upon the proper exercise of independence by NILC. It also misunderstands the relationship of NILC with DoJ and with other Departments of the Executive and I deal with that in the next section.
Reverting to independence, certainly such independence is by no means absolute. The Document also quite properly provides as noted above for the conditions for funding for NILC and for NILC to be held to account for its performance (and of course the Hunter Review is part of that process).
But the Document does seem to me to wrongly inhibit the operational independence of NILC. For instance, if a (future) Minister of Justice decreed that the 'fair and impartial system of justice' delivered 'effectively and efficiently' required a policy of 'zero tolerance' of criminal behaviour my fear would be that such Ministerial policy could be wielded to constrain NILC from project research that such a policy was ineffective or (for stated reasons) undesirable. A law commission does not have independence, if it cannot perform such challenge function.
It is the case that the Document is expressed not to alter or detract from any legal powers or responsibilities of the Commission 24 but it seems to me that these stipulations of the Document are a chill factor on NILC's proper operational independence.
The relationship of NILC with DoJ and other government departments
The position is set out in the Relationship Document:
"Its corporate governance and accountability fall to the DoJ but the Commission's advisory functions for Northern Ireland law reform are to all the Departments of the Northern Ireland Executive and (where appropriate) to Government Departments at Westminster (where any proposed law reform relates to an excepted or reserved matter). The Reports of the Commission must be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly ('the Assembly') and, where appropriate as above, before each House of Parliament." 25 It may be argued that under section 52 (1) of the 2002 Act (as amended) gives the DoJ the dominant role, as NILC must send its Reports to DoJ. But firstly this does not apply to Reports relating to excepted or reserved matters 26 : the Commission must under section 52(3) of the Act send any Reports relating to excepted or reserved matters to the Secretary of State. Secondly, there is an express statutory duty on the DoJ under section 52(2) of the Act that it must lay before the Assembly a copy of each such Report received by it. (There is an equivalent duty on the Secretary of State under section 52(4) of the Act to lay any Reports received by her before Parliament.) While these are technical provisions, they are important in principle as well as detail. They connote that the Reports do not become the 'property' of the Minister of the DoJ (or of the Secretary of State). Neither has any power to require any amendment before laying nor to 'bury' any Report without laying.
This seems to me to be right in regard to the principle of independence (as well of course as being the law to be observed). But it also is felicitous in the particular circumstances of the division of powers between the Departments of the Northern Ireland Executive (under the power sharing arrangements of the Northern Ireland Act 1998). Given the division of political control among the various Departments, it would be incongruous if a NILC Report on, for instance, a matter within the purview of the Department of the Environment came under the political control of the Minister for Justice by reason of DoJ asserting dominance of control over all aspects of the work of NILC.
If there are proposals for change in the institutional structures of NILC, I trust that this principle of independence from DoJ operational control, and of NILC providing the reform function to all Departments (and to Westminster in the case of excepted or reserved matters), will be preserved. 24 ibid 25 para 1.1.1 26 Those legislative areas which are still outside the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly
